Abstract-This
ble to receive x with probability p and otherwise receive y Monotonicity requires that (x, p, y) IS preferred to (z, p, y) if and only if AT IS prefen^ed to z However, Birnbaum et al (1992) found that when p s 2, ($0, p, $96) receives a higher judgment than ($24, p, $96) , even though $24 IS higher than $0 The judged values of the highest pnce that a buyer should pay to play the gamble, the lowest pnce that a seller should accept to sell the gamble, and the "fair" price (from a neutral point of view) all showed similar results Higher judgments were assigned to the dominated gamble when p= 05, l,and 2, but not whenp & 4 Similar results were also found when $72 replaced $% as the higher outcome Because It IS so reasonable to assume that people prefer more money to less, these results seem a stnking violation of monotonicity Mellers, Weiss, and Birnbaum (1992) conducted a senes of expenments to explore when the violations occur in judgment TTiey used a different format for presentation of the probabilities (pie charts), which might reduce tendencies to attempt numencal calculations, but the violations persisted They found that violations of monotonicity occurred consistently when judgments of (x, p, y) were compared with judgments of (0, p, y), when p < 2 and 0 < or < ^3 The violations persisted when y was increased from $81 50 to $960, they were also found for negative values (when p < 2 and 0 > x > y/3), but not when x and y were of opposite sign The pattern of results matched the predictions of the configural weight model of Birnbaum et al (1992) , descnbed in the appendix Mellers et al (1992) found that violations persisted even when real money was used as an incentive, but they found one condition that significantly reduced violations of monotonicity When the key gambles were pnnted on the same page, there were fewer violations, as if conditions that facilitate compansons among the gambles reduce violations Birnbaum and Sutton (1992) replicated the results of Birnbaum et al (1992) for judgments of buyer's pnces and seller's pnces Birnbaum and Sutton also presented the gambles in pairs and found that although judgments of the gambles violated monotonicity when gambles were judged one at a time, it was extremely rare for subjects to choose the dominated gamble when both were presented simultaneously in a direct companson Because judged values showed a different ordenng from that obtained in direct choice, Birnbaum and Sutton identified their finding as a new type of preference reversal
In the "classic" preference reversal (Lichtenstem & Slovic, 1971 , Lindman, 1971 , gambles with equal or nearly equal expected values are compared Subjects assign higher pnces to gambles with a small probability to win a high outcome [e g , ($0, 95, $%)) than they do to gambles with a high probability to win a small outcome [e g , ($0, 2, $6)] However, when subjects are offered a direct companson, they choose the gamble with the higher probability to win Researchers in preference theory were both disturbed and excited by these reversals, because they seemed to show that the most fundamental relationship in the theory, the preference relation itself, IS difficult to operationalize in an internally consistent fashion (Krantz, Luce, Suppes, & Tversky, 1971 ) A number of theones were profwsed to explain why different methods of elicitation yield different preferences (Birnbaum, in press, Busemeyer & Goldstein, in press, Mellers, Orddnez, & Birnbaum, in press, Schoemaker & Hershey, in press, Slovic, Lichtenstein, &. Fischhoff, 1988 , Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988 , von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986 Bostic, Hermstein, and Luce (1990) found that these classic preference reversals were reduced when choice-based certainty equivalents were used instead of judged certainty equivalents Choicebased certainty equivalents appeared better than judged certainty equivalents in predicting which of two gambles a judge would choose when offered a direct companson One might conclude, then, from Bostic et al (1990) , Bimbaum and Sutton (1992), and MeUers etal (1992) , that perhaps reversals of preference, including both the classic reversals and the reversals due to monotonicity violations, might be reduced if certainty equivalents were determined by the method of choice, rather than by judgment However, presenting the choice between a gamble and a cash value does not offer the "transparent" situation afforded in a direct choice between gambles, since each gamble is compared to an amount and the expenmenter tests monotonicity by examining how each gamble stacks up against money
In decision making, there has been a standard assumption that when faced with a choice between a gamble and a sure amount, the subject compares the utility of the gamble with the utility of the companson amount and chooses the gamble if and only if its utility exceeds that of the money However, there is evidence that choice is not that simple
In psychophysics, judgment and choice are known to be subject to contextual effects (Birnbaum. 1982 , Birnbaum, Parducci, & Gifford, 1971 , MeUers & Birnbaum, 1982 , Parducci, 1990 , Parducci & Haugen, 1%7, Poulton, 1989 ) Gamer (1954 attempted to find a tone that would seem "half as loud" as a standard tone by asking subjects in a choice-based procedure to judge whether each companson tone was "more" or "less" than "half as loud" as the standard He manipulated the context (distnbution) of companson stimuli and found that the tone inferred to be "half as loud" as the standard was the median of the companson stimuli Gamer concluded that subjects may have no idea what tone is half as loud as another and that the expenmenter determines the result by the selection of compansons, two expenmenters would find two different "half-loudness" values by using different compansons with the same standard Since Gamer's paradigm IS analogous to the procedures used to fmd choice-based certainty equivalents. It IS reasonable to ask if choices in decision making might also be susceptible to the same psychological processes of context as psychophysical judgments
The present expenment investigated this question by manipulating the distnbutton of companson amounts It also investigated whether monotonicity violations persist in the companson procedure METHOD Instnictions read (in part) as follows On each tnal you will be offered a companson between an amount of money and a gamble, or lottery Your task is to decide whether you would prefer the money (for sure) or the chance to play the lottery (the gamble)
Compare the gamble to each amount If you prefer the amount of money circle the amount Circle all of the sure amounts of money that you would prefer to the gamble
Stimuli and Design
Gambles were displayed as in the following example
This display represents a probability of 2 to win $24 and a probability of 8 to win $96 Subjects were instructed to imagine a can with 20 slips specifying the smaller amount and 80 specifying the larger amount, 1 slip would be chosen at random to determine the amount won Probabilities displayed always summed to I The 30 binary gambles were generated from a factonal design of six pairs of amounts [{x, y) = ($0, $24), ($0, $48), ($0, $%), ($24, $48), ($24, $%), ($48, $%)] combined with five levels of the probability of receiving the smaUer amount (p = 05, 2, 5, 8, or 95)
Comparison Contexts
Each of the 30 gambles was presented for companson with two sets of comparison amounts Context 1 (positively skewed distnbution) included the following dollar amounts 1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8,9, 10, n, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90 Context 2 (negatively skewed distribution) included the following dollar amounts 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83. 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, and 90 These companson amounts were pnntcd in ascending order, in a vertical column below each gamble
Procedure and Subjects
The 30 gambles, with their companson amounts, were pnnted in random order in two booklets, each booklet began with instructions and six warm-up tnals Each booklet contained either Context 1 or Context 2 companson amounts, and the warm-ups for each context used the appropnate senes of compansons for the condition Half of the subjects completed Context 1 followed by Context 2, and half of the subjects received the booklets in the opposite order In addition, half of the subjects received a different order of tnals (these order effects were negligible)
Instructions stated that subjects should prefer a gamble to any amount less than the least amount the gamble would offer and that they should prefer amounts of money that exceeded the most the gamble could offer Subjects who violated these properties dunng the warm-up were directed to reread instructions before proceeding [This instniction would have the effect of reducing violations of monotonicity because it rules out any response less than $24 for the ($24, p, $%) gamble, but does not rule out small values for the ($0, p, $%) gamble ]
The subjects were 46 undergraduates at Califomia State University, FuUerton They received extra credit m an introductory psychology course
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The minimum value of money preferred to each gamble was taken as a dependent vanable Table 1 Table 1 ), 70% of the subjects showed at least one violation of monotonicity, 50% of the subjects violated monotonicity more often than they satisfied it, whereas only 25% satisfied it more often than not (the others came out even) Violations of monotonicity were similar in both contexts (see Table 1 and, in the unhkely event that we go bankrupt, you will receive 25% of your investment back," this statement would make the investment seem worse Apparently, an unlikely zero outcome is easier to ignore than a small payoff Configural weight theory can predict the violation of monotonicity by assuming that when the lowest outcome of a gamble is zero, the lowest outcome receives lower weight than when It IS positive (see the appendix) Table 1 shows that the means were higher for 29 of the 30 gambles in Context 2 than in Context 1 The average difference was $4 86, which is statistically significant, F(l, 44) = 26 68 At low levels of probability to win the larger amount (1 -p), the context effect was greater than at higher levels of probability, especially for gambles in which x = 0, the Context x Probability interaction was significant, F(4, 176) = 4 13, but other interactions involving context were not The model is closely related to rankdependent utibty theones. which were developed independently (see review by Wakker. in press), except that configural weighung allows weights to depend on point of view and to differ for the zero-valued outcomes, which allows configural weight theory to explain violations of monotonicity Changes in the configural weight parameters, ay explain why the rank order of gambles changes in different points of view Configural weight theory led to estimated u{x) functions that were invariant with respect to point of view (Bimbaum et al , 1992) . estimated u{x) functions also agree with estimates based on subtractive theory applied to judgments of ratios and differences" of nskless utility (Bimbaum & Sutton. 1992) Contextual effects can be discussed with respect to the following model of choice
Contextual Effects

P(6. O = FIU(G) -u(c)].
(A2)
where P(G c) is the probability of choosing the gamble G = (x p y) over the sure amount c U is a function (e g . Equation Al) that assigns an overall utility to each gamble, u IS a utility function for money, and F is a monotonic function that maps a given utility difference into a choice probability The results in Table 1 
